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Abstract. This study implements behavioural economics and fraud 
auditing approach. This study looks at several factors that have been cited 
in previous studies as determinants of bribery. The result shows that long 
tenure increases the probability of corruption between civilian and public 
servant and penalty can be a good disincentive for corrupt behaviour but it 
is more effective towards the recipient instead of briber.  
1 Introduction  
Corruption is a serious problem that has been huge concern for the government since the 
impact hurts many parties. One type of corruption which regulated in Law No. 20 of 2001 
is bribery. Bribery is defined as giving something to the officials in order to influence the 
decision making of the officials. Bribery is closely related to the bureaucracy. The longer 
the bureaucracy officer in charge of a position, the more likely bribery occurs. According to 
research by Transparency International Indonesia in 2013, four out of ten people of 
Indonesia pay bribes and approximately 71% of it paid as bakhshes to speed up the service. 
According to the same research, people pay bribes to obtain public services in the police 
department, courts, civil registration, and licensing. Hence bribery is a manifestation of 
corruption that should be eradicated. 
2 Literature Review  
2.1 Corruption and Bribery 
The term corruption is a general term that can lead to various definitions. Corruption can be 
defined as financial crime; there is also a call fraud. Definition of corruption itself can vary. 
Law No. 20 of 2001 defines corruption as 'act of enriching oneself or another person or a 
corporation that can be detrimental to state finance or economy of the country'.  
 According to [5], they include the corruption as one of the three financial crime and 
fraud in addition to misappropriation of assets in the financial statements. Then, Law No. 
20 of 2001 lays out seven corruption-related corruptions among other state assets, bribery, 
embezzlement in office, extortion, cheating, conflict of interest in procurement, and 
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gratuities. Of the seven types of corruption, bribery the most widely dealt corruption form 
by KPK during the year 2004-2015 [4]. There are a total of 192 cases of bribery handled by 
KPK. Beside that bribery is also the corruption form that is easily found in Indonesia and 
tends to be easily implemented. Due to this reasons, bribery could quickly become a culture 
and increasingly difficult to combat and make it more dangerous among other types of 
corruption.  To understand the bribe then we observed a few things. First, a bribe will 
happen if there are two parties involved i.e. those who give bribes and those who receive 
bribes. Second, bribery can occur in two directions. Bribes can be started from the giver 
who gives bribes own initiative or at the request initiated from the recipient of bribes. 
Third, bribes are selling influence like buying and selling. Fourth, there are expectations for 
the return of the bribe giver and the bribe recipients benefit from the optimization. 
2.2 Power 
Power according to this study is defined as the ability to determine the size of bribes. Power 
is not restricted as structural position or positions in the organization. A person considered 
to be in power if he had bargaining power in determining how much should be paid for by 
the bribe giver. Previous research [14] also argues that a person may have power without 
status or status without power, but only when there is a clear distinction between formal 
and informal authority. According to [19] [20] the power plays a role in social relationships 
and focus on the person's intentions or actions to carry out for example the dominance and 
influence, [14]. Research [14] defined power as an individual person's capacity to modify 
others to give or withhold resources or punishment. Example of resources and punishment 
in the context of bribery is economic opportunity or material. Power is considered as one of 
the factors driving the emergence of an act unethically. The more powerful a person the 
stronger the urge to ask for bribes. Although not directly related to bribery however, power 
has an influence on personal decision-making. Examples [11] found under generally when 
the individual power increases, the assessment of performance against others decline and 
self-assessment tends to rise. There are allegations under the authority also will affect the 
bribe. 
2.3 Punishment 
One deterrent factor of corruption is the fear of punishment. Punishment becomes a 
disincentive for corrupt behaviour [13]. Another theory supports that the penalty would 
reduce bribery behavioural intention is Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). TPB proposed 
by [2] predicts that the positive consequences of an action, the person will tend to want to 
do. Conversely, if one considers the consequence of an action is negative (i.e. penalties) 
then the person will decrease his intentions. Research by [24] stated that the main driver of 
an action is the reward not a punishment. Kind of punishment also has a different effect on 
the behaviour of bribes. If placed in a continuum that there is a relationship with the 
deterrent effect of the low to the high. In this study we believe that penalty will be variable 
moderation of three independent factors namely power, motivation, and culture.  
 
2.4 Bribery Game 
 
Bribery game is of plenty manifestation of laboratory experimental economics. Laboratory 
experiments enable us to test ideas and theories that may be impossible to test naturally in 
real world. It also allows us to simulate what can possibly happen in real world into a 
human-made laboratory environment, it nearly impossible to be done in real world due to 
ethical value.  Numbers of researches have done research on corruption, however using 
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laboratory experiment to determine the behavior of briber and bribe receiver is not yet very 
common. Research [8] categorize experiments on corruption corruptibility as those   
involving   bilateral   settings   and   unilateral   settings. In one of the first investigations, 
[10] focused on individual tendencies to engage in corruption in procurement and whether 
economists are more likely to accept bribes. Later on, [10] extended their analysis to state 
how intrinsic motivations are affected by threats of penalties. [17] conducted a laboratory 
experiment on free riding: individuals were asked to allocate a given financial endowment 
to private use and contributions to a public good. Research [6] used an ultimatum 
bargaining game, where the ‘proposer’ offers a division of a given amount of $10 between 
him and the ‘responder’. [10] conducted a prisoner’s dilemma experiment and found that 
economics majors defect significantly more often (60 percent) than non-majors (39 
percent). This paper mostly inspired by previous researches that were conducted 
specifically to analyze corrupt behavior like [1] [10], 16[] and [12].  
3 Methodology and Experimental Design  
According to [1] there are three main characteristics of bribery the first is reciprocal 
relationship between the briber and the bribed, secondly the existence of negative effects 
for the social welfare of society, and the third is punishment when action is known by law 
enforcement agencies. Referring to research carried out by [1], we replicate the conditions 
of treatments in lab experiments to see whether the three main characteristics have impact 
on bribery. The experimental design by [1], contained two actors, people who are bribed (in 
this case are government employees) can accept or reject the bribe. Bribers have the option 
to transfer some money to influence the decisions of government employees. The game is 
done in sequence, where the first player is the briber and the second player is the recipient 
of the bribe (denotes as government officials). Following the design of experiments by [1], 
this study will conduct three types of treatment situations. The number of subjects in our 
experiment is 32 people who play in pairs, which means we have 16 pairing in the 
experiment. The whole experimental situation is more easily understood through this Game 
Tree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Game Tree 
 
The game tree shows all possible outcomes for this experiment. The general rule of the 
experiment is the first player must pay mandatory public service fee and optional bribe then 
player two, whether accept or reject the bribe, must provide player one with the mandatory 
public service. The mandatory public service fee is 2$ and public service value is 3$. 
Besides that, everything the second player receives will be tripled. 
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 In stage 1, the first player (briber) must decide whether to transfer a sum of money 
amounting to 2$ as administration fee and value of bribes (between 0 and 8$) to the second 
player. After that, the second player (government officer) must decide whether to accept or 
reject the transfer. If refused, the transfer did not take place and the multiplier simply 
tripled the value of 2 to 6. Value 6 will be divided equally, 3 points back to the first player, 
and 3 points remain stored second player. Stage 2 is similar to Stage 1, the only different is 
we induce random pairing for the subjects. Meaning the subjects will exchange partner in 
every round of this stage. The different pairing system denotes power. Fixed pairing is 
metaphor for long tenure where public officer is in charge in his position for so long hence 
obtains certain power in bribery matter. The random pairing denotes the absent of power 
where public officer is constantly rotated therefore has no ability to obtain power. In real 
world we often witness that bribery is most likely to happen when public officer has been 
around for so long and his presence is well known by potential bribers. The goal of this 
stage is to see how potential bribers react if the public officer is changed a lot. The random 
pairing is called “Random” in the analysis. Stage 3 is similar to Stage 1, the only different 
is we introduce instrument of penalty. All subjects will be audited randomly, if they get 
caught engaged in corruption they will lose all of the payoff in the current round as 
punishment.  
 We built these following hypotheses for our research: 
H1: The power will positively influence the behaviour of bribery 
H2: The penalties will reduce the impact of variable power, motivation, and behavioural 
culture of bribery against bribery 
4 Analysis   
We conducted t-test on the different value of average bribe and giveback from all subjects 
to see if there is difference among the treatments. The amount of bribe indicates the 
willingness to bribe from first player. Meanwhile the amount of giveback indicates the 
willingness to cooperate with briber from second player. Result of the t-test is showed in 
the table 1. below. 
Table 1. T-test Result for Average Bribe and Giveback 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 According to the Table 1. above we can see that not all of the t-test showed 
significant result. In terms of the bribe value, only treatment “Paired Reg and Random 
Reg” and “Paired Reg and Paired SD” have significant difference. Significant difference 
between “Paired Reg and Random Reg” shows that instrument randomized pairing does 
affect behaviour of briber. This fact might indicate the importance of rotation among public 
officers. Significant difference between “Paired Reg and Paired SD” shows that instrument 
 
Treatment Mean Std. Dev Diff Significant Treatment Mean Std. Dev Diff Significant
Paired Reg 2.625 2.94 Paired Reg 4.150 4.789
Random Reg 1.65 2.359 Random Reg 2.800 3.156
Paired Reg 2.625 2.94 Paired Reg 4.150 4.789
Paired SD 1.488 0.263 Paired SD 1.800 2.839
Paired Reg 2.625 2.94 Paired Reg 4.150 4.789
Random SD 1.85 2.537 Random SD 2.450 1.28
Paired SD 1.488 2.349 Paired SD 1.800 2.839
Random Reg 1.65 2.359 Random Reg 1.650 2.359
Random Reg 1.65 2.359 Random Reg 1.650 2.359
Random SD 1.85 2.537 Random SD 2.450 1.28
Paired SD 1.488 2.349 Paired SD 1.800 2.839
Random SD 1.85 2.537 Random SD 2.450 1.28
Average Difference Test for Bribe Average Difference Test for Giveback
0.975 YES 1.350 NO
1.138 YES 2.350 YES
-0.2 NO
0.775 NO
-0.16 NO
-0.36 NO -0.650 NO
0.350 YES
1.700 YES
-1.000 YES
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penalty does affect behaviour of briber. This fact might indicate the importance of penalty 
and regulation in bribery. Meanwhile in Table 1 we can also see that not all of t-test 
showed significant result. In terms of the giveback value, only treatment “Paired Reg and 
Paired SD”, “Paired Reg and Random SD”, “Paired SD and Random Reg”, and “Random 
Reg and Random SD” have significant difference, when it comes to giveback, any 
treatment including SD or penalty shoes significant different. This might indicate that 
second players are more reluctant to bribery when introduced to penalty. 
 
 Fig. 2. The Amount of Average Bribe                                 Fig. 3. The Amount of Average Giveback 
In Figure 2. and Figure 3., we can see the average value of bribes and giveback that 
are chosen by the participants. Based on these data, we can see for the case of bribery, on 
average, the highest is Paired NonSD treatment. It is not surprising, because in the 
treatment Paired NonSD there is no risk of punishment. Beside that in the treatment Paired 
NonSD subjects did not change partners. By having fix partner, there might be trust 
between them. The same thing applies in the case giveback. On the other hand, the average 
bribe and giveback is lowest for the treatment of Paired SD. This suggests that the risk of 
punishment makes someone reluctant to commit bribery.   
 
5 Conclusion  
According to the analysis above we can draw several conclusions. Bribery is more likely to 
occur in treatment fixed pairing (Pairing), this indicates that long tenure in public service 
might attract bribery. Hence periodic rotation among public officials is important. The 
implementation of punishment or penalty that impoverish can reduce the amount of bribe 
that occurs from the side of the bribe giver and the bribe receiver (which do giveback). This 
is shown in the average value of treatment with sudden death (SD) which has an average 
Bribe and giveback lower than the treatment without SD. But based on the results of this 
research, procurement punishment is more effective if applied at the receiving end of 
bribery. This may be due, the public officials "have more to lose" than those who give 
bribes.  
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